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Abstract Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature
in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP)
to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy (osf.io/dvkpr). Drawing on a
representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we
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the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field
of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going
forward.
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1 Introduction
Over the last several years, impressive efforts have been made to estimate the
reproducibility of various empirical literatures. Notable examples include the Open
Science Collaboration’s (OSC) attempt to estimate the reproducibility of psycholog-
ical science (Open Science Collaboration 2015), the Reproducibility Project’s
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analogous initiative for cancer biology (Nosek and Errington 2017), meta-scientist
John Ioannidis’s modeling efforts in biomedicine and beyond (e.g., Ioannidis 2005)
and a 2015 estimate produced by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System for research in economics (Chang and Li 2015). Although there is ongoing
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debate about what the optimal replication rate1 should be for a given field in light of
trade-offs between, e.g., innovation and confirmation (Gilbert et al. 2016; Makel &
Plucker, 2014), many scientists regard the estimates that have been generated—less
than 50% in each of the above cases—as worryingly low. For example, a survey of
1576 scientists conducted by Nature revealed that 52% percent thought there was a
“significant” reproducibility crisis (Baker 2016). A smaller percentage, 3%, thought
there was no crisis, while 38% thought there was a “slight” crisis and 7% were
unsure. What is not a matter of controversy, however, is that these replication
initiatives have generated much-needed discussions among researchers about the
state of their sciences. Aspects being put under the microscope include the reliability
and effectiveness of common research designs, statistical strategies, publication
practices, and methods of peer review (Benjamin et al. 2018; Earp and Wilkinson
2017; Findley et al. 2016; Lakens et al. 2017; Locascio 2017; Young, Ioannidis, &
Al-Ubaydli, 2008). Meanwhile, promising ideas for improvement—including the
recent push toward norms of pre-registration—are now gaining traction among
leading scientists (Chambers and Munafò 2013; Munafò et al. 2017; Nosek et al.
in press; but see Lash and Vandenbroucke 2012; Scott 2013).
One field that has yet to see such an initiative take place is experimental philosophy.
As a new academic movement that aims to supplement the classic ‘armchair’ approach
of analytic philosophy with empirical research, experimental philosophy—x-phi for
short—uses the data-driven methods characteristic of the social sciences to make
progress on the sorts of questions that have traditionally been studied by philosophers.
Traditionally, experimental philosophers have focused on the empirical study of phil-
osophically relevant intuitions, including factors that shape them and psychological
mechanisms that underlie them (Knobe et al. 2012; Knobe and Nichols 2008; Machery
2017a). However, there have recently been calls to go beyond this restrictive concep-
tion focused solely on intuitions, to a more inclusive conception that is more reflective
of the breadth of work in the field (Cova 2012; O’Neill and Machery 2014; Rose and
Danks 2013). A more comprehensive definition of experimental philosophy, then,
could be the use of empirical methods to put to test key premises of philosophical
arguments. These premises need not only involve claims about people’s intuitions, but
could also involve testable assumptions about people’s attitudes, behaviors, percep-
tions, emotional responses to various stimuli, and so on. Experimental philosophy is
thus inherently interdisciplinary and can often yield insights about ‘how the mind
works’ that may be of interest to other fields (Knobe, 2007, Knobe 2016).
Insofar as x-phi overlaps with other disciplines that study how the mind works, such
as cognitive science or social psychology, one might expect that its empirical output
should be approximately as replicable as research in those other areas. According to the
33 Center for Logic, Language and Cognition, Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences,
University of Turin, Turin, Italy
34 Sciences, Normes, Décision (FRE 3593), Université Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, France
35 Juan de la Cierva Research Fellow, Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados (IESA-CSIC),
Córdoba, Spain
36 University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
1 Meaning, the ratio of published studies that would replicate versus not replicate if a high-quality replication
study were carried out.
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OSC estimate concerning psychology, there was some variation in reproducibility
depending on sub-field. Papers published in more ‘cognitive’ journals, such as the
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, reportedly
replicated at rates of 48–53%, while papers published in the more ‘social’ journals,
such as the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, replicated at rates of 23–29%
(Open Science Collaboration 2015). Since x-phi research explores both ‘cognitive’ and
‘social’ questions depending on the nature of the philosophical premise being tested,
one possible prediction is that its findings should replicate somewhere in the middle of
those estimated ranges, that is, roughly in the vicinity of 35%. If so, we would have
good reasons to doubt the reliability of most results gathered by experimental philos-
ophers. How trustworthy, then, is the published literature in our field?
1.1 The Need for ‘Direct’ Replication
To answer this question, ‘direct’ replications are needed (Doyen et al. 2014). Direct
replications—often contrasted with ‘conceptual’ replications—are replications that
attempt to follow the design and methods of an original study as closely as possible
in order to confirm its reported findings. Conceptual replications, by contrast, involve
making a deliberate change to one or more aspects of the original design or methods,
often to explore issues surrounding generalizability (Crandall and Sherman 2016;
Hendrick 1990; Schmidt 2009; for a different take on the relation between direct and
conceptual replications, however, see Machery 2017b). But such ‘replications’ may not
be sufficient to identify likely weaknesses or potential errors in the published literature
(Earp in press). As Doyen et al. (2014, p. 28) note:
The problem with conceptual replication in the absence of direct replication is
that there is no such thing as a “conceptual failure to replicate.” A failure to find
the same “effect” using a different operationalization can be attributed to the
differences in method rather than to the fragility of the original effect. Only the
successful conceptual replications will be published, and the unsuccessful ones
can be dismissed without challenging the underlying foundations of the claim.
Consequently, conceptual replication without direct replication is unlikely to
[provide meaningful evidence about the reliability of the] underlying effect.
Fortunately, experimental philosophers have not been blind to such issues. Until
recently, Joshua Knobe and Christian Mott curated the “Experimental Philosophy
Replication Page,” a webpage dedicated to collecting all direct replications of exper-
iment philosophy findings (be they published or unpublished).2 As of November 2017,
the page identifies 99 direct replications of experimental philosophy studies, with 42 of
these having been classified as unsuccessful replications. Using these data as the basis
for an estimate, the replication rate for experimental philosophy would be 57.6%.
Although this is higher than the estimate for psychology derived by the OSC (
2015), it is still not very encouraging.
2 http://experimental-philosophy.yale.edu/xphipage/Experimental%20Philosophy-Replications.html.
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But such an estimate would be misleading. Studies that appear on the Replication
Page are those that have attracted the interest—or suspicion—of the researchers who
attempted to replicate the studies. By contrast, there is likely to be little motivation to
replicate a finding that is relatively unsurprising or intuitively robust, which in turn
would lead to an exclusion bias against the plausibly more replicable findings. Thus, it
is doubtful that studies on the Replication Page constitute a representative sample of
experimental philosophy studies. Further support for this view comes from the fact that
cross-cultural studies and gender comparisons are vastly overrepresented on the Rep-
lication Page, accounting for 41 replications out of 99 (41.4%), a rate that is far beyond
the true proportion of such studies (see Knobe 2016).
Given such considerations, a large and representative sample of studies should be
selected and assessed for their (direct) replicability. To accomplish this task, we took
inspiration from prior replication initiatives such as the OSC project in psychology, and
established the X-Phi Replicability Project (XRP), a coordinated effort involving more
than 40 researchers from 20 replication teams across 8 countries tasked with conducting
and interpreting high-quality direct replications of a wide-ranging sub-set of x-phi
studies. Our goal was to derive an accurate estimate of the reproducibility of results
obtained by experimental philosophers.
1.2 Interpreting Replications
We begin with a note of caution. Scientists have long understood the importance of
replicating each other’s work: it is not enough for you to report that you ran an
experiment and obtained certain results; I should be able to run the same experiment
and obtain the same results, if I am to be justified in placing confidence in what you
reported (Schmidt 2009). But this is clearly an oversimplification. Even under the best
of circumstances, one can never run exactly the same experiment that another scientist
ran: at the very least, time will have passed between the original experiment and the
replication. Moreover, the materials, methods, setting, and background conditions may
differ to some degree as well, despite one’s best efforts to keep these functionally the
same (Collins 1975; Earp and Trafimow 2015; Stroebe and Strack 2014). A more
accurate characterization of the follow-up study, then, is that it should be sufficiently
similar along these and other relevant dimensions that one can meaningfully compare
its results to those of the original study. In like manner, the results themselves should be
sufficiently similar to the original that one can be justified in concluding—however
tentatively—that it is the same basic phenomenon being observed, notwithstanding the
existence of random variation, statistical noise, measurement error, and so on.3
Keeping this in mind, for purposes of estimation we needed to decide for each
replication study whether it counted more in favor of, or against, the original reported
3 In practice, it can be hard to determine whether the ‘sufficiently similar’ criterion has actually been fulfilled
by the replication attempt, whether in its methods or in its results (Nakagawa and Parker 2015). It can therefore
be challenging to interpret the results of replication studies, no matter which way these results turn out (Collins
1975; Earp and Trafimow 2015; Maxwell et al. 2015). Thus, our findings should be interpreted with care: they
should be seen as a starting point for further research, not as a final statement about the existence or non-
existence of any individual effect. For instance, we were not able to replicate Machery et al. (2004), but this
study has been replicated on several other occasions, including in children (Li et al. 2018; for a review, see
Machery, 2017a, chapter 2).
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finding: that is, whether it should be classed as a ‘successful’ or an ‘unsuccessful’
replication. There is no single or definitive way to do this (Maxwell et al. 2015; Open
Science Collaboration 2015). Rather, as with data derived from any study, one must
take into consideration a number of factors in order to decide what those data can
reasonably be taken to show. Our approach was to use three different methods for
designating a replication attempt as a success or a failure, and to report an overall
reproducibility estimate based on each method. We will briefly describe these methods
in turn:
(a) Were the replication results statistically significant? For the present research,
we defined ‘statistically significant’ as a p-value less than .05, following the
currently conventional default standards for Null Hypothesis Significance
Testing (NHST). However, we must emphasize that the exclusive use of the
p-value in a single study to draw inferences about the existence of an effect
is controversial (Amrhein and Greenland 2017; Benjamin et al. in press;
Trafimow and Earp 2017). Thus, p-values should serve as just one piece of
information out of many such pieces in a robust, flexible, and context-
sensitive inferential process (American Statistical Association 2016;
Lakens et al. 2017; McShane et al. 2017; Murtaugh 2014). Moreover, the
use of p-values as a criterion for success is especially dubious when applied
to studies reporting null results (Boyle in press), thus calling for alternate
ways of assessing replication success.
(b) Subjective assessment of the replicating team. Although a subjective judgment
may seem less reliable than a hard-and-fast decision procedure like NHST, this
approach has certain advantages. As noted, a single p-value is only one piece of
information in an overall judgment about what the data show (American
Statistical Association 2016). By asking our researchers to register their overall
subjective judgment about whether the effect replicated, therefore, they were able
to take into consideration the ‘wider picture’ concerning, e.g., facets of study
design, methodological details, aspects of the underlying theory as they bear on
prediction, and so on.
(c) Comparison of the original and replication effect size. The theoretical signif-
icance of an effect does not depend only on its existence but also on its size
(Cumming 2013). What counts as a successful replication on the p-value criterion
might not always count as a satisfactory replication from a theoretical point of
view (see Box 1). Thus, one can also estimate the success of one’s replication
attempt by comparing the original effect size to the replication effect size. Because
sample sizes of replication studies were typically larger than those of original
ones, and because calculation of confidence intervals (CIs) for original effect sizes
were not always possible (due to a lack of information), we decided to draw this
comparison by investigating whether the original effect size fell within the 95% CI
of the replication effect size.
Based on these three criteria, the X-Phi Replicability Project aimed to evaluate the
reproducibility of experimental philosophy. The first step was to select a representative
sample of studies.
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2 Method
2.1 Study Selection
2.1.1 Selected Studies
40 studies were selected for replication. For each year between 2003 and 2015
(included), three papers were selected: one as the most cited paper for this year, and
two at random (except for 2003, for which only two papers were available). This
yielded a total of 38 studies, to which we added 4 additional studies in case some of the
originally selected studies proved too challenging to replicate. Out of these 42 studies,
we were ultimately able to attempt to replicate 40.
2.1.2 Selection History
To establish an exhaustive, non-arbitrary list of experimental philosophy papers,
we began with the papers indexed on the Experimental Philosophy Page
(http://experimental-philosophy.yale.edu/ExperimentalPhilosophy.html), a
resource commonly used by experimental philosophers to make their papers
publicly available, and the most comprehensive available collection of
experimental philosophy papers.4 However, an initial search through this
database revealed that a non-trivial number of papers fell well outside of
“experimental philosophy” as we have described it above and as it is typically
understood, including papers about, e.g., pragmatic abilities in people with
autism spectrum disorder (De Villiers et al. 2007) or the way people choose
to punish norm violators in real-life situations (Clavien et al. 2012).
To narrow our choice down and prevent the inclusion of such outliers, we supple-
mented our preliminary approach with a list of 35 scientific journals. The list was
established by XRP coordinators Florian Cova and Brent Strickland by excluding
4 Note that this page is basically a mirror of the “Experimental philosophy” category of the Philpapers
database.
Box 1. What counts as a successful replication? The importance of effect sizes and theory
Whether something counts as a successful replication depends in part on what the theoretical significance of
a given effect-size estimate is. For example, Nichols and Knobe (2007) once argued that the negative
emotional reactions elicited by certain actions might impact our judgments about free will and moral
responsibility in a (theoretically) significant way, and that this might in turn explain why people are
prone to attribute free will and moral responsibility to deterministic agents on some occasions but not
others. In their original study, shifting from a ‘low-affect’ to a ‘high-affect’ action raised the rate of moral
responsibility attributions from 23 to 64%, thus changing participants’ modal answer. However, in a
meta-analysis based on several unpublished replications, Feltz and Cova (2014) found that, although
there was indeed a significant effect of affect, this effect was very small and accounted for only 1% of the
variance in participants’ answers. Thus, though Nichols and Knobe’s effect might be seen as having been
‘successfully replicated’ according to the p-value criterion, the smaller effect size estimate from the
meta-analysis of replications stands in tension with their original theoretical conclusions, as the original
authors acknowledge (Knobe, personal communication).
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journals from the Experimental Philosophy website that were not known for publishing
“experimental philosophy” papers as defined earlier, and then systematically collecting
the reference of every paper from the remaining journals that contained at least one
empirical study (i.e., a study involving the collection of data from participants or any
other source in order to test a given hypothesis).
From this set of papers, we retained only those that were published between 2003 and
2015. The upper limit was set by the fact that study selection took place in Spring 2016.
The lower limit was set by the fact that experimental philosophy papers only began to be
regularly published starting in 2003, mostly in the wake of Joshua Knobe’s two seminal
papers on intentional action and side-effects (Knobe, 2003a, b).5 At the end of this
process, our list of potential papers contained 242 references that met the following
criteria: (i) featuring on the “Experimental Philosophy Page”, (ii) being published in one
of the 35 journals we identified, and (iii) being published between 2003 and 2015.
To generate our sample, we selected three papers per year between 2004 and 2015
included (for 2003, we selected two papers, as there were only two available for that
year, as noted). The first paper was the most cited paper of the year (according to
Google Scholar) and the second and third were selected at random. This yielded a total
of 38 papers selected for replication.6
Our next step was to evaluate individual studies in terms of their feasibility for being
replicated. We identified four studies as being more demanding than others on practical
grounds on the basis that they required access to a special population (Machery et al.,
2004, requiring Chinese participants; Knobe and Burra, 2006, requiring Hindi-speaking
participants; Lam, 2010, requiring Cantonese speakers; and Zalla and Leboyer, 2011,
requiring individuals with high-functioning autism). Because we could not ensure that
replication teams would have the wherewithal to conduct these replications in the
available time, a second, plausibly more feasible, study was selected as a potential
replacement—either at random if the original paper was selected at random; or the
second most-cited paper of the year if the original was the most cited.7 When both the
‘demanding’ replication and its more feasible replacement were conducted on time, we
decided to include both results in our final analysis. In the end, although we were able
to conduct a replication of Machery et al. (2004) and Knobe & Burra (2006), no
replication team had the resources necessary to replicate Lam (2010) or Zalla and
Leboyer (2011). We thus were left with 40 studies to replicate. The list of all papers
(and studies) selected for replication can be found in Appendix 1.8
5 Despite two important studies published in 2001 (Greene et al. 2001; Weinberg et al. 2001), no experimental
philosophy paper is to be found for 2002.
6 There was some initial debate about whether to include papers reporting negative results, that is, results that
failed to reject the null hypothesis using NHST. We decided to do so when such results were used as the basis
for a substantial claim. The reason for this was that negative results are sometimes treated as findings within
experimental philosophy. For example, in experimental epistemology, the observation of negative results has
led some to reach the substantive conclusion that practical stakes do not impact knowledge ascriptions (see for
example Buckwalter 2010; Feltz and Zarpentine 2010; Rose et al. in press). Accordingly, papers reporting
‘substantive’ negative results were not excluded.
7 Note, however, that the more ‘demanding’ paper that was originally selected was not discarded from our list,
but remained there in case research teams with the required resources agreed to replicate these studies.
8 It should be noted that two other papers were replaced during the replication process. For the year 2006,
Malle (2006) was replaced with Nichols (2006), given that the original paper misreported both the results and
statistical analyses, making comparison with replication impossible. For the same year, Cushman et al. (2006)
proved to be too resource-demanding after all and was replaced by Nahmias et al. (2006).
Cova F. et al.
2.2 Assignment of Papers to Replication Teams
The recruitment of replication teams (RTs) took place mostly between October and
December 2016. This involved an invitation for contributions that was included in a
call for papers for a special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology devoted
to the topic of replication. The call for papers was subsequently posted on various
relevant websites; prominent researchers within the experimental philosophy commu-
nity were also directly contacted and invited.
Once RTs committed to joining the replication project, they were sent the full list of
papers that had not yet been assigned. RTs were invited to estimate the number of
replications they could feasibly undertake, and to identify all papers from the available
list they could not handle, either because (i) they did not have the resources necessary,
or (ii) this would have involved some conflict of interest. Based on these constraints,
papers were then randomly assigned to RTs.
2.3 Pre-Replication Procedure
For each paper, RTs were first asked to fill out a standardized pre-replication form (see
Appendix 2). On this form, they were asked to identify the study they would replicate
in the paper (in case the paper contained several studies, which was often the case). RTs
were instructed to select the first study by default, unless they had a good reason not to
(e.g., the first study was only a pilot, or suffered from clear methodological shortcom-
ings that were corrected in later studies). The reason for this instruction was that many
experimental philosophy papers present their most striking findings in the first study,
with later studies being devoted to controlling for potential confounds or testing for
more specific explanations of these results.9
Next, RTs were asked to report certain information about the study they
selected to replicate. First and foremost, they were asked to identify the study’s
main hypothesis (or to choose one hypothesis when several equally important
hypotheses were tested within the same study). They were then asked to report
what statistical analyses were employed to test this hypothesis and the results
of these analyses (when no statistical analysis was reported, which occurred
several times for early experimental philosophy studies, RTs were asked to
reconstruct the appropriate statistical test). When possible, RTs were asked to
compute the corresponding effect size and 95% confidence interval.
RTs were also asked to answer a few additional questions about the original study.
Questions were about (i) the size and nature of the original sample, (ii) the presence or
absence of a selection procedure, and (iii) whether the original paper contained all of
the information necessary to properly conduct the replication.
Finally, RTs were asked to compute the sample size needed for their replication. For
studies reporting significant results, the replication sample size was computed on the
basis of the original effect size, assuming a power of 0.95. Because initial effect size
estimates in the literature tend to be inflated due to publication bias (Anderson et al.
2017; Button et al. 2013), we elected to use a higher than usual power assumption
9 In this respect, our methodology differed from the OSC’s methodology, which instructed replication teams to
focus on the papers’ last study.
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(typically .80) so that we would be able to detect even smaller effects that nevertheless
do exist. For studies reporting null results (see footnote 6), RTs were instructed to use at
least twice the reported sample size, given that the results might have been due
insufficient power in the original study.
Completed pre-replication forms were then sent to Florian Cova for approval.
Once the forms were approved, RTs were instructed to pre-register their replica-
tion on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/), using the Pre-Registration
form of the Replication Recipe (Brandt et al. 2014). Following best practices
(Grens 2014), RTs were also advised to contact authors of the original study to
ensure the greatest fidelity along all relevant dimensions between the original
study and the replication. Most original authors agreed to help the RTs, and we
thank them for their contribution.
2.4 Post-Replication Procedure
After running the replication study, RTs were asked to fill out a post-replication
form (see Appendix 3). The post-replication form asked RTs to report the
procedure and results of their replication study as they would in a normal
research paper. Then, they were asked to report about their study the same kind
of information they reported about the original study in the pre-replication form
(effect size, 95% CI, size and nature of their sample). Finally, RTs were asked to
report their own subjective assessment about whether they successfully replicated
the original result.
Once the post-replication form was completed, replication teams were instructed to
upload it, along with the all relevant data and documentation, to the corresponding OSF
depository, and to register their results using the post-registration form of the Replica-
tion Recipe (Brandt et al. 2014) if possible.
Details for all individual replications can be accessed online through the X-Phi
Replicability Project main OSF page (osf.io/dvkpr).
2.5 Replication Teams (RTs)
Overall, 20 RTs (involving 40 persons) took part in the replication project.
Once the data were collected, an additional project member was recruited
(Brian Earp) to aid with interpretation and theoretical framing, as well as
drafting various sections of the manuscript. Research teams from 8 countries
(Brazil, France, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States) were involved.
3 Results
40 studies were repeated one time each in an attempt to replicate the originally reported
results. Studies came from several different sub-areas of experimental philosophy: 8 from
Action Theory, 1 from Aesthetics, 4 from Causation, 5 from Epistemology, 8 from Free
Will, 8 from Moral Psychology, 1 from Philosophy of Language, 2 from Philosophy of
Mind, 3 uncategorized.
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The average N was 215.1 (SD = 542.3) for original studies and 206.3 (SD = 131.8) for
replication.10 However, the mean for the original studies was biased by an extremely highN
for one study with 3422 participants (Hitchcock &Knobe, 2009). In fact, the medianNwas
85 for original studies and 183 for the replication studies. In 32 studies out of 39 that used
participants (excluding Reuter, 2011, that used internet hits as data points), the replication N
was greater than the originalN. Overall, meanNs for original studies tended to increase over
time, going from an average of 57.5 in 2003 to 162 in 2015.
Both original and replication studies made ample use of convenience samples, but
there were differences between the two. The original studies, particularly in the early
years of experimental philosophy, tended to use university students: out of 39 studies,
25 used student samples, 6 used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers, 4 used
other online samples, and 4 used pedestrians recruited from the street. On the contrary,
replication studies tended to focus on online samples: out of 39 studies, 29 used MTurk
workers, 6 used other online samples, and 4 used university students. This difference in
populations comes with the possible disadvantage of lowering replication rates—insofar
as the original findings were dependent upon a particular population—but simulta-
neously allows for an assessment of generalizability (see below).
Out of 32 studies reporting a significant result and for which we could perform the
relevant power analysis, 26 had a power superior or equal to 0.80, and 18 had a power
superior or equal to .95 (assuming the original study’s effect size). The average power
was 0.88 (SD = 0.14).11
To assess the successful replication rate, we used three different criteria as described
earlier: (i) the RT’s subjective assessment, (ii) p-values and statistical significance, and
(iii) comparison of the original and replication effect sizes.
3.1 Replication Team’s Subjective Assessment
We first examined RTs’ subjective assessment of whether they had successfully
replicated the original results. Out of 40 replications, 31 were considered to be
successful replications by the RTs that conducted them, yielding a successful replica-
tion rate of 77.5% by this metric. The replication rate was 78.4% (29 out of 37) for
original studies presenting significant results, and 66.7% (2 out of 3) for original studies
presenting null results.
3.2 p-Values
We then assessed replication success using the p-values obtained by the RTs. For
original studies presenting statistically significant results, a replication was considered
successful when p < .05 and the effect went in the same direction as the original effect.
The 3 studies presenting null results were excluded from this analysis, given the
difficulty of assessing such results using NHST (Boyle in press).
By these criteria, the overall successful replication rate was 78.4% (29 out of 37).
10 Ns were computed not from the total N recruited for the whole study but from the number of data points
included in the relevant statistical analysis.
11 For this analysis, studies for which power > 0.99 were counted as power = 0.99.
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3.3 Comparison of Original and Replication Effect Sizes
As a final criterion for successful replication, we compared the original and
replication effect sizes. First, when possible, original and replication effect sizes
were converted to a common r effect size, and 95% CI interval were computed
for both. This was possible when the corresponding statistical test was either (i)
a Chi-square test with df = 1, (ii) a Student’s or Welch t-test, (iii) a correlation
test, or (iv) an ANOVA with df1 = 1. When this was not possible, alternate
effect sizes and 95% CIs were used (such as RMSEA for Structural Equation
Modelling). When the replication obtained an effect that went in the opposite
direction to the original effect, replication effect sizes were coded as negative.
Effect sizes and 95% CI for replication are presented in Fig. 1.
For studies reporting statistically significant results, we treated as successful repli-
cations for which the replication 95% CI was not lower than the original effect size.12
For studies reporting null results, we treated as successful replications for which
original effect sizes fell inside the bounds of the 95% CI.
We were able to calculate (i) the original effect size and (ii) the replication 95% CI
for 34 studies out of 40 (32 original studies reporting significant effects, 2 reporting null
effects). Details of the results are presented in Table 1. Overall, according to this more
stringent criterion,13 the overall successful replication rate was 24 successful replica-
tions out of 34 (70.6%).
Of note, when focusing on studies originally reporting statistically significant
results, it seemed that only 9 out of 32 (28.1%) overestimated their effect size compared
to the replication estimate (assuming that the latter is more accurate). For these 32
studies, the average original r effect size was 0.39 (SD = 0.16), while the average
replication r effect size was 0.34 (SD = 0.24) (see Fig. 2). The effect size for this
difference was small (t(62) = 0.85, p = .40, d = 0.21, power = 0.22), suggesting that
original effect sizes were not much larger than replication effect sizes.
3.4 Most Cited Vs. Random Studies
In our study selection, we picked studies both at random and among the most cited
ones. One reason for this procedure was that we wanted our estimate to be
12 For studies reporting statistically significant results, we counted studies for which the original effect size
was smaller than the replication 95% CI as successful replications on the ground that, given the studies’
original hypotheses, a greater effect size than originally expected constituted even more evidence in favor of
these hypotheses. Of course, theoretically, this need not always be the case, for example if a given hypothesis
makes precise predictions about the size of an effect. But for the studies we attempted to replicate, a greater
effect size did indeed signal greater support for the hypothesis.
13 As pointed out by a reviewer on this paper, this criterion might even be considered too stringent. This is
because, in certain circumstances in which no prediction is made about the size of an effect, a replication for
which the 95% CI falls below the original effect size might still be considered as a successful replication, given
that there is a significant effect in the predicted direction. Other ways of assessing replication success using
effect sizes might include computing whether there is a statistical difference between the original and
replication effect size (which would present the disadvantage of rewarding underpowered studies), or
considering whether the replication effect size fell beyond the lower bound of the 95% CI of the original
effect size (which returns a rate of 28 successful replications out of 34 original studies, i.e. 82.4%).
Nevertheless, we decided to err on the side of stringency.
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Fig. 1 Original effect size, replication effect size and replication 95% CI for each study. For descriptions of
“Content Based,” “Observational Data,” “Context Based,” and “Demographic Effect” see Section 4.3
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representative of both experimental philosophy at large (random selection) and the
kinds of effects people are more likely to discuss when thinking about experimental
philosophy (most-cited papers). Overall, the papers we selected as most cited had a
Fig. 2 Effect sizes (correlations) for original and replication studies. Replication studies are sorted by type of
studies (observational, content-based, context-based, or demographic)
Table 1 Results for the comparison of the original effect size with the replication 95% CI. Bold numbers
indicate replications that count as successful
Original effect size is __ the replication 95% CI Below Within Over
Significant effects 5 18 9
Null effects 0 1 1
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greater number of citations per year ratio than papers we selected at random (M = 30.7,
SD = 18.0 vs. M = 8.4, SD = 6.1; t(38) = 5.835, p < .001, d = 1.93).14
Table 2 summarizes the replication rates according to all three criteria for both most-
cited and randomly selected studies. Overall, the replication rate for most-cited studies
(subjective assessment = 64.3%) was lower than the replication rate for randomly
selected studies (subjective assessment = 84.6%). However, a logistic regression did
not reveal citation rates to be a significant predictor of success (measured through
subjective assessment) (OR = −0.97, p = .18). Thus, due to the small size of our sample,
it is not possible to determine with confidence whether this reflects an actual trend or is
simply the product of random variation.
3.5 Effect of Publication Year on Replication Success
There was no evidence of an effect of publication year on replication success (as
measured by p-values or RTs’ subjective assessment), OR = 0.99, t = −0.14, p = .89.
3.6 Generalizability of Results Obtained on Convenience Samples
As mentioned above, within our sample, most original studies used pedestrians or
university students as convenience samples, while most replications used online survey
participants (mostly MTurk workers) as convenience samples. This allows us to assess
the generalizability of results obtained from such samples. Among our studies, we
identified 24 in which the original sample was either a pedestrian (4 out of 24) or
university student (20 out of 24) sample and the replication sample an online sample.
Out of these 24 studies, 20 successfully replicated (according to RTs’ subjective
assessment), a replication rate of 83.3%. Thus, it seems that most original findings
based on convenience samples such as pedestrians or university students could be
generalized to online samples (Casler et al. 2013).
3.7 Summary
Overall, our three criteria converge on the conclusion that the reproducibility rate of
experimental philosophy studies, as estimated through our sample, is greater than 70%.
14 This analysis was done on the basis of Google Scholar’s citation count (as of March 23rd, 2018).
Table 2 Replication rates according to three criteria (subjective assessments, p-values, and effect size
comparisons) for most cited and randomly selected studies
Subjective assessment P-values Effect sizes
Most cited (N = 14) 64.3% 64.3% (9 out of 14) 54.5% (6 out of 11)
Random (N = 26) 84.6% 87.0% (20 out of 23) 78.3% (18 out of 23)
TOTAL 77.5% 78.4% (29 out of 37) 70.6% (24 out of 34)
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Moreover, the analysis of effect sizes for studies originally reporting significant effects
suggests that most of them did not overestimate their effect sizes compared to replications.
4 Potential Explanations for the Relatively High Replication Rate
Recall that, for the OSC attempt to estimate the reproducibility of psychological
science, the replication rate was 36.1% - 47.4% depending on the measure, which is
much lower than the roughly 70% replication rate we observed for x-phi studies. How
are we to explain our finding that x-phi results seem to replicate at a far higher rate than
results in psychological science? In the following sub-sections, we explore several
different (though not mutually exclusive) answers.
4.1 Larger Effect Sizes
The OSC attempt found that effect sizes were good predictors of an effect’s replicability
(Spearman’s rank-order correlation of 0.277 for the original effect size and of 0.710 for
replication effect sizes). Thus, the higher replicability rate of experimental philosophy
results might be explained by those results’ being characterized by larger effect sizes.
For original effect sizes, the OSC reports an average r effect size of 0.403 (SD =
0.188). This is in fact higher than our average original r effect size (M = 0.38, SD =
0.16). But the initial estimates—at least for the psychology studies—were most likely
inflated due to publication bias, relatively small sample sizes, and other factors
(Anderson et al. 2017; Button et al. 2013). Let us assume that effect size estimates
derived from replication studies are on average more accurate than those reported in
original studies, due to the interaction of publication bias and statistical regression to
Fig. 3 Original and replication effect sizes per year
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the mean (Trafimow and Earp 2017). In this case, replication effect sizes were actually
higher for x-phi studies (M = 0.33, SD = 0.23), compared to psychology studies (M =
0.20, SD = 0.26). Since the most-cited and random x-phi studies did not differ in either
original, t(32) = 0.30, p = .77, or replication effect size, t(35) = 0.18, p = .86, the large
average effect among the sample of x-phi studies is not likely due to oversampling from
highly-cited publications. This suggests that the true effect sizes reported in x-phi may
tend to be on average larger than those in reported in psychology studies. This, in turn,
would increase the relative likelihood of effects from x-phi studies replicating.
However, we should note that, at least among the studies we replicated, effects were
especially large in the early years of experimental philosophy but have tended to get smaller
over time. Indeed, publication year correlated negatively with effect size (converted to r)
whether looking at original reports, r(31) =−.36, p = .040, or replication data, r(34) = −.37,
p = .025 (see Fig. 3), even when excluding studies that were originally reported as null
results (original, r(30) = −.42, p = .017; replication, r(32) =−.44, p = .009). One possible
explanation for this trend is that later studies tend to be attempts to elaborate on initial
findings by decomposing them into constituent parts, as illustrated by the trolley literature
(Cova 2017) or the literature on the side-effect effect (Cova 2016). Another possibility is that
it is increasingly unlikely over time that one will observe a large effect that had previously
gone unnoticed. However, such possibilities would best be explored by analyzing the effects
of publication year on the population of experimental philosophy studies as a whole, which
is not something we are able to undertake based on our sample.
4.2 Cost of Studies
Another explanation for the higher replicability rate for experimental philosophy
compared to psychology could be that x-phi studies are, on average, ‘easier’ to run –
in large part by being less costly. Indeed, many experimental philosophy studies are
simple surveys that can be relatively quickly and inexpensively administered.
This feature might explain the higher replication rate in two ways. First, ‘easier’
studies might lead to larger sample sizes, which in turn might lead to higher-powered
studies. To test for this hypothesis, we compared sample sizes in our sample to typical
sample sizes in social-personality psychology. According to Fraley and Vazire (2014),
median sample sizes in the latter field range from 73 to 178, depending on the journals.
As we saw, themedianN for our studies was 85, which falls within this range.Moreover,
assuming a typical effect size or r = .20, Fraley and Vazire found that the power of the
typical social-personality psychology study was below the recommended 80% and even
reached 40% for certain journals. Using a similar method, we computed power assuming
an effect size of r = .20 for original x-phi studies for which a r effect size could
theoretically be computed (34 out of 40). The average power was 0.5 (SD = 0.28) and
only 7 studies out of 34 reached a power > .80. Thus, if the easiness of running
experimental philosophy studies explains our higher replication rate, it is not because
it allowed our original studies to be higher-powered than typical psychology studies.
However, there is a second way in which ‘easiness’ might explain the higher
replicability rate: because there is relatively little cost (in terms of time and resources)
in running an x-phi study, experimental philosophers can recruit more participants per
condition, double-check their results by re-running the study if they are uncertain about
any findings, and subject their results to scrutiny by others, who can in turn easily run
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their own replications. By contrast, the more time- or resource-intensive it is to obtain
data, the more distressed a researcher may feel about failing to get something ‘pub-
lishable’ out of the effort. This in turn could promote so-called Questionable Research
Practices (Fiedler and Schwarz 2016; John et al. 2012) which may increase the
likelihood of committing a Type 1 error (Simmons et al. 2011).
To test this second ‘easiness’ hypothesis, we rated our 40 studies according to how
easy to run we perceived them to be. Scores ranged from 0 to 2. One ‘difficulty’ point was
awarded to studies that were not simple surveys that could have potentially been run
online (for example, studies that involved a cognitive load task and as such required an in-
lab setting, such as Greene et al., 2008). An additional ‘difficulty’ point was awarded to
studies that required an unusual population and so could not be run using a convenience
sample (for example, cross-cultural studies comparing specific populations, such as in
Machery et al., 2004). In the end, no study received a score of 2: 36 studies received a
score of 0, and 4 a score of 1. This highlights the relative ‘easiness’ of running x-phi
studies in general. As expected, the replicability rate for ‘difficult’ studies was lower than
the rate for ‘easy’ studies: 50% (2 out of 4) compared to 80.6% (29 out of 36).
What about psychology studies? To complete the comparison, wewent back to the list of
studies replicated by the OSC project and selected 99 of them that (i) were included in the
final OSC analysis and (ii) made the results of the replication available. We then rated them
in the same way as we rated the x-phi studies. Overall, out of 99 studies, 17 received a score
of 0, 70 a score of 1, and 12 a score of 2. This suggest that psychology studies were indeed
more ‘difficult’ to run on average, which might factor into the difference in replication rate
between experimental philosophy and psychological science. However, within the OSC
project, the replicability rate was not much higher for ‘easy’ studies (43.8%, 7 out of 16),
compared to ‘medium’ (38.2%, 26 out of 68) and ‘difficult’ studies (36.4%, 4 out of 11),
which suggests that other factors than ‘easiness’ might be at play.
4.3 Type of Effects
Why else, then, might our replication rate have been so much higher? Another
hypothesis is that the high replication rate for x-phi studies might be due to the kind
of effect studied by experimental philosophers. Indeed, the studies selected for replica-
tion in our project can be organized into four main categories:
1) Observational studies: These are studies that do not involve data collected in an
experimental setting in which independent variables are under the direct control of
the experimenter, but rather make use of other kinds of data (e.g. instances of
linguistic expressions in a corpus as in Reuter, 2011).
2) Content-based studies: These are studies that focus on how participants perform a
certain task or react to certain stimuli (e.g., how intentional they find an action to
be), and how their behavior is determined by the content of the task or stimuli.
Experimental manipulation in these studies typically focuses on changing certain
properties of the task or the content of the stimuli and testing whether this change
affects participants’ responses (e.g., changing the side effect of an action from
‘harming the environment’ to ‘helping the environment’ and seeing how this
affects participants’ judgments of an agent’s intention, as in Knobe, 2003a).
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3) Context-based studies: These are studies that keep the content of a task or stimulus
constant but explore how participants’ reactions can be changed by manipulating
the context and the way in which the content is presented (e.g., presenting the
stimuli with or without cognitive load as in Greene et al., 2008; presenting the same
vignette in a first- versus third-person framing as in Nadelhoffer & Feltz, 2008).
4) Demographic effects: These are studies that keep both the content of the stimulus and/
or task and the context in which it is presented constant, but explore how participants’
answers can be shaped by differences in the participants themselves (e.g., cross-cultural
comparisons such as in Machery et al., 2004; correlations between character traits and
philosophical intuitions as in Nadelhoffer, Kvaran & Nahmias, 2009).
In investigating the effect of kind of study on the replicability of experimental
philosophy, we tested two related hypotheses. The first is that most x-phi studies fall
into the second category: they study how participants’ reactions to a given stimulus
(vignette) are shaped by properties of the stimulus itself (its content). The second is
that, at least within our sample, effects of the second kind (content-based) are less
fragile than effects of the third (context-based) and fourth (demographic effects) kinds.
Indeed, context-based effects are often dependent on the participant’s attention, and her
or his ignorance of the manipulation (Cesario 2014), while demographic effects are
threatened by intra-group variability (Heine et al. 2002).
To test these hypotheses, we first classified our 40 studies as falling within one of
these four categories: 1 fell into the observational category, 31 fell into the content-
based category, 4 into the context-based category, and 4 into the demographic effect
category.15 These results support the first hypothesis: experimental philosophy studies
seem to be mostly content-based, focusing on how (a change in) the content of a given
stimulus (typically a vignette) impacts participants’ reactions.
We next tested the second hypothesis, asking whether content-based studies are
more replicable than the others. Table 3 sums up the replication rate (based on RTs’
subjective assessment) for each category (excluding the observational category, for
which we only had one data point). For our sample at least, it does appear that content-
based studies have a higher replication rate when compared to context-based and
demographic-based studies.16 They also tended to have larger effect sizes (see Fig. 2).
Of course, this conclusion pre-supposes that context-based and demographic-based
studies make up a greater proportion of studies in traditional psychological science than
in experimental philosophy. To determine whether this is really the case, we went back
once again to the list of 99 OSC studies we selected, and categorized them in the same
way we categorized x-phi studies. We ended up with 34 content-based studies, 44
context-based studies, 16 demographic-based studies, 4 observational studies, and 1
that was uncategorized. Thus, content-based studies played a less important role in
psychological science than in experimental philosophy (χ2(1, N = 139) = 19.62,
15 In a previous version of this manuscript, we reported 30 content-based studies and 5 demographic effects.
However, helpful commentaries from readers, including Wesley Buckwalter, led us to revise our classification
for Nichols (2004).
16 A low replication rate for demographic-based effects should not be taken as direct evidence for the
nonexistence of variations between demographic groups. Indeed, out of 3 demographic-based effects that
failed to replicate, one was a null effect, meaning that the failed replication found an effect where there was
none in the original study.
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p < .001). Moreover, the replication rate for content-based studies was 64.5%, while it
was 20.5% for context-based studies and 31.3% for demographic-based studies.
Thus, the difference in replication rates between experimental philosophy and psycho-
logical sciencemight be explained by the different kinds of effects they typically investigate:
while experimental philosophy focus mostly on robust effects triggered by changes in the
content of the very stimulus participants are asked to react to, traditional psychological
science tends to focus more on subtle effects wherein participants are led to react differently
to a given stimulus by external changes. This contrast might be heightened by the fact that
many of the content-based effects investigated by experimental philosophers are effects that
can be accessed to some extent introspectively. For example, Dunaway et al. (2013) found
that philosophers were able to predict a priori some central results in experimental philos-
ophy. In this respect, parts of experimental philosophy might be compared to works in
linguistics, and derive their reliability from the fact that some effects are robust enough to be
introspectively assessed (see Sprouse and Almeida 2017).
4.4 Differences in Culture and Practice
Finally, it might be that differences in replication rates could be explained by differ-
ences in academic cultures and research practices. Based on such perceived differences,
Liao (2015) predicted a higher replication rate for experimental philosophy studies
before the launch of the XRP. As philosophers, Liao noted, x-phi researchers might be
more sensitive to certain methodological questions, such as what counts as strong
evidence for a given claim; moreover, they might have a more welcoming attitude
toward replication – in part due to the typically low cost of running x-phi studies, as
mentioned above – and be more transparent in some of their research practices.17
These perceived characteristics of the practice and culture of experimental philoso-
phy might have contributed to the relatively high replication rate by discouraging
questionable research practices. Although these claims are hard to test directly, a few
indicators provide indirect support. First, as noted, published effect sizes for x-phi
studies appeared to be only slightly (and non-significantly) overestimated as compared
to effect sizes in the replication attempts: ratio of mean-replication to mean-original
effect size = .88, paired t(31) = 1.67, p = .11. Second, when researchers p-hack, the
resulting distribution of p-values below .05 tends to be flat or even leftward skewed
17 Possible reasons for such transparency might be that (i) experimental philosophy is still a smaller academic
community where individual researchers are likelier to be well known to each other and thus able and willing
to hold each other accountable, and (ii) research resources (such as online survey accounts) used to be shared
among researchers in the early days of the field, thus making questionable research practices more difficult to
obscure (see Liao 2015).
Table 3 Replication, average original effect size and replication effect size for each category of studies
Type of effect Replication rate Average original effect size Average replication effect size
Content-based 90.3% 0.41 (0.17) 0.39 (0.21)
Context-based 25.0% 0.22 (0.08) 0.01 (0.06)
Demographic effect 25.0% 0.29 (0.10) 0.12 (0.10)
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(Simonsohn et al. 2014), whereas the p-curve for our target set of x-phi findings
revealed a substantial rightward skew (see Fig. 4), with few p-values in the .025–.05
range. Finally, recent research by Colombo et al. (2017) found that the rate of statistical
reporting inconsistencies was lower in experimental philosophy than in others parts of
behavioral science. In any case, Liao (2015) does seem to have been right with his
prediction, and we cannot exclude the possibility that the higher observed replicability
of x-phi findings compared to psychology findings might reflect particular cultural
values and research practices within the field.
One such cultural value might be a greater tolerance or even appreciation among
experimental philosophers for negative or null results. As many have argued, the
systematic non-publication of null results – which contributes to the so-called file-
drawer effect – is a leading factor in increasing the proportion of false positives in the
literature and thus of non-replicable effects (Earp 2017; Franco et al. 2014; Rosenthal
1979). In our experience, experimental philosophers tend to have a more positive
attitude toward null results: they take null results from adequately powered studies to
have some evidential value, and indeed some key findings in experimental philosophy
are based on failures to reject the null hypothesis (which might explain why 10% of the
studies we sought to replicate were null results, while studies with null results only
constituted 3% of OSC’s original pool). Moreover, null results that are clearly or at least
plausibly due to weaknesses in the study design can be discarded without too much
anguish: as noted, x-phi studies tend to be fairly easy as well as inexpensive to run,
such that there is little incentive to ‘tease’ an ultimately dubious finding out of a data set
Fig. 4 Distribution of p values corresponding to target effects in original publications, generated by the p-
curve app (www.p-curve.com; see Simonsohn et al. 2014). Three studies reported insufficient information to
calculate precise p values, and therefore are excluded. Two other p values (> .05) were not displayed
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for the sake of publication. Instead, one can simply run another, better-designed study,
only submitting for publication results in which one has high confidence (ideally
because one has already replicated them in one’s own lab).
In fact, compared to ‘traditional’ psychologists, experimental philosophers may be less
susceptible to such ‘publish-or-perish’ pressures in general. First, it is presumably far easier
to abstain from publishing the (dubious) results of a study that took a few days or weeks to
run – as is common in x-phi research – than a study that took many months to run at
potentially great cost. And second, experimental philosophers may not need to publish data-
driven papers in order to maintain or advance their careers in the first place. In their capacity
as philosophers, at least, they may have ample opportunities to publish papers without any
data—i.e., dealing ‘purely’with theoretical issues—and the publication pressure is generally
lower in philosophy. Taken together, these and the above-mentioned factors might create
field-specific norms and practices that decrease the likelihood of false positives proliferating
throughout the literature. Finally, although we do not have direct evidence of this, it is
possible that philosophy journals are on average less reluctant than psychology journals to
publish null results. If so, this would diminish problems associated with the file-drawer
effect, thus reducing the proportion of non-replicable effects.18
5 Conclusion
In this project, our goal was to reach a rough estimate of the reproducibility of
experimental philosophy studies. We sampled 40 studies from the experimental phi-
losophy literature, and drew on the resources of 20 separate research teams from across
8 countries to undertake a high-quality replication of each one. Based on three different
classification systems, we converged on an estimated replication rate situated between
70 and 78%. This means that, roughly, the replication rate for experimental philosophy
would be 3 out 4.
This appears to be good news for experimental philosophy. As a new field, it has
been subjected to criticism from skeptical quarters, including the claim that it is little
more than bad psychology—an upstart enterprise run by philosophers who mimic the
methods of behavioral science without fully mastering or even understanding them
(Cullen 2010; Woolfolk 2013). In the wake of the replication crisis, this line of thought
gave rise to the companion-in-guilt argument: if experimental philosophy is just bad
psychology, and if psychology suffers from a serious replication problem, then we
should expect experimental philosophy to fare even worse (see Liao 2015). Indeed, the
replication crisis in psychology has sometimes been framed as a limitation of—or
argument against—experimental philosophy (see Loeb & Alfano, 2014, Section 5.1).19
In this context, the results of the current replication initiative appear to provide a
strong, empirically-based answer to these criticisms. In particular, our observed
18 One more cynical explanation would simply be that experimental philosophers are less well versed in into
statistics, and that certain questionable research practices are only available to those who have sufficient skills
in this area (i.e., the ability to take advantage of highly complex statistical models or approaches to produce
‘findings’ that are of questionable value).
19 For example, as of November 2017, the Wikipedia page for “Experimental Philosophy” dedicates a large
part of its “Criticisms” section to the “Problem of Reproducibility,” arguing that “a parallel with experimental
psychology is likely.”
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replication rate of over 70% seems to undermine pessimistic inductions from low
replicability rates in psychology and other behavioral sciences to presumed replication
rates in experimental philosophy. It also calls into question the idea of x-phi being mere
‘amateurish’ psychology, suffering from the same shortcomings and methodological
issues as the latter, only worse. Simply put, such a characterization of experimental
philosophy is inconsistent with our findings.
Of course, these results should not be taken as invitation for experimental philosophers
to rest on their laurels and no longer worry about methodological issues in the behavioral
sciences. As long as we are uncertain of the reason behind experimental philosophy’s high
replication rate, we cannot reasonably infer that future experimental philosophy studies
will meet the same success. That said, we have considered a number of potential factors:
the apparently larger typical effect sizes in x-phi studies, the lower cost of running survey-
based experiments, the different kinds of manipulations characteristic of x-phi research
(e.g., content-based vs. context-based), and perceived cultural norms discouraging the use
of questionable research practices while encouraging greater transparency and acceptance
of null results. Each of these explanations makes a different prediction: for example, if the
high replication rate of experimental philosophy depends on the size of the effects it
typically investigates, then we would need to adjust our practice as experimental philos-
ophy begins searching for more subtle and smaller effects. If it is due to experimental
philosophy’s focus on easy-to-run, content-based studies, then a similarly high rate should
not be taken for granted as more complex, context-based studies begin to become more
widespread. And finally, if it stems from values and practices that are specific to the field,
then we should try to maintain and foster this positive culture. The current project, which
could not have been possible without the contribution of so many dedicated researchers
willing to engage in a good-faith collective enterprise to examine the strengths and
weaknesses of their science, might be one important step in this direction.
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Appendix 1. List of Studies Selected for Replication
(Crossed-out studies are studies who were planned for replications but did not get
replicated.)
*2003
Most cited: Knobe, J. (2003a). Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.
Analysis, 63(279), 190–194. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/hdz5x/).
Random: Knobe, J. (2003b). Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental
investigation. Philosophical Psychology, 16(2), 309–324. [Study 1] (Content-based, suc-
cessful, osf.io/78sqa/).
*2004
Most cited: Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. P. (2004). Semantics, cross-
cultural style. Cognition, 92(3), B1-B12. (Demographic effect, successful, osf.io/qdekc/)
– Replacement: Knobe, J. (2004). Intention, intentional action and moral considerations.
Analysis, 64(282), 181–187. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/ka5wv/)
Random 1:Nadelhoffer, T. (2004). Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to
Knobe and Mendlow. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24(2),
259–269. (Content-based, unsuccessful, osf.io/w9bza/).
Random 2: Nichols, S. (2004). After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judg-
ment. Philosophical Psychology, 17(1), 3–26. [Study 3] (Content-based, successful,
osf.io/bv4ep/).
*2005
Most cited:Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005). Surveying
freedom: Folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psy-
chology, 18(5), 561–584. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/4gvd5/).
Random 1: McCann, H. J. (2005). Intentional action and intending: Recent empirical
studies. Philosophical Psychology, 18(6), 737–748. [Study 1] (Context-based, null
effect, successful, osf.io/jtsnn/).
Random 2:Nadelhoffer, T. (2005). Skill, luck, control, and intentional action.Philosophical
Psychology, 18(3), 341–352. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/6ds5e/).
*2006
Most cited: Cushman, F., Young, L., & Hauser, M. (2006). The role of conscious
reasoning and intuition in moral judgment testing three principles of harm. Psycholog-
ical Science, 17(12), 1082–1089.
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– Replacement: Nahmias, E., Morris, S. G., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2006). Is
incompatibilism intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(1),
28–53. [Study 2] (Content-based, unsuccessful, osf.io/m8t3k/)
Random 1: Knobe, J., & Burra, A. (2006). The folk concepts of intention and
intentional action: A cross-cultural study. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1),
113–132. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/p48sa/)
– Replacement:Malle, B. F. (2006). Intentionality, morality, and their relationship in
human judgment. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1), 87–112.
– Replacement: Nichols, S. (2006). Folk intuitions on free will. Journal of Cognition
and Culture, 6(1), 57–86. [Study 2] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/8kf3p/)
Random 2: Nadelhoffer, T. (2006). Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional
actions: Some problems for juror impartiality. Philosophical Explorations, 9(2), 203–
219. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/bv42c/).
*2007
Most cited:Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral responsibility and determinism: The
cognitive science of folk intuitions. Nous, 41(4), 663–685. [Study 1] (Content-based,
successful, osf.io/stjwg/).
Random 1: Nahmias, E., Coates, D. J., & Kvaran, T. (2007). Free will, moral respon-
sibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Midwest studies in Philosophy,
31(1), 214–242. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/pjdkg/).
Random 2: Livengood, J., & Machery, E. (2007). The folk probably don’t think what
you think they think: Experiments on causation by absence. Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, 31(1), 107–127. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/7er6r/).
*2008
Most cited: Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J.
D. (2008). Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cog-
nition, 107(3), 1144–1154. (Context-based, unsuccessful, but with deviations from the
original procedure, see osf.io/yb38c).
Random 1: Gonnerman, C. (2008). Reading conflicted minds: An empirical follow-up
to Knobe and Roedder. Philosophical Psychology, 21(2), 193–205. (Content-based,
successful, osf.io/wy8ab/).
Random 2: Nadelhoffer, T., & Feltz, A. (2008). The actor–observer bias and moral
intuitions: adding fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s fire. Neuroethics, 1(2), 133–144. (Con-
text-based, unsuccessful, osf.io/jb8yp/).
*2009
Most cited: Hitchcock, C., & Knobe, J. (2009). Cause and norm. The Journal of
Philosophy, 106(11), 587–612. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/ykt7z/).
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Random 1: Roxborough, C., & Cumby, J. (2009). Folk psychological concepts: Causation.
Philosophical Psychology, 22(2), 205–213. (Content-based, unsuccessful, osf.io/5eanz/).
Random 2: Nadelhoffer, T., Kvaran, T., & Nahmias, E. (2009). Temperament and
intuition: A commentary on Feltz and Cokely. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(1),
351–355. (Demographic effect, null effect, unsuccessful, osf.io/txs86/).
*2010
Most cited: Beebe, J. R., & Buckwalter, W. (2010). The epistemic side-effect effect.
Mind & Language, 25(4), 474–498. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/n6r3b/)
Random 1: Lam, B. (2010). Are Cantonese-speakers really descriptivists? Revisiting
crosscultural semantics. Cognition, 115(2), 320–329.
– Replacement: Sytsma, J., & Machery, E. (2010). Two conceptions of subjective
experience. Philosophical Studies, 151(2), 299–327. [Study 1] (Demographic
effect, successful, osf.io/z2fj8/)
Random 2: De Brigard, F. (2010). If you like it, does it matter if it’s real? Philosophical
Psychology, 23(1), 43–57. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/cvuwy/).
*2011
Most cited: Alicke, M. D., Rose, D., & Bloom, D. (2011). Causation, norm violation,
and culpable control. The Journal of Philosophy, 108(12), 670–696. [Study 1] (Con-
tent-based, unsuccessful, osf.io/4yuym/)
Random 1: Zalla, T., & Leboyer, M. (2011). Judgment of intentionality and moral
evaluation in individuals with high functioning autism. Review of Philosophy and
Psychology, 2(4), 681–698.
– Replacement: Reuter, K. (2011). Distinguishing the Appearance from the Reality
of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(9–10), 94–109. (Observational data,
successful, osf.io/3sn6j/)
Random 2: Sarkissian, H., Park, J., Tien, D., Wright, J. C., & Knobe, J. (2011). Folk
moral relativism. Mind & Language, 26(4), 482–505. [Study 1] (Content-based,
successful, osf.io/cy4b6/).
*2012
Most cited: Paxton, J. M., Ungar, L., & Greene, J. D. (2012). Reflection and reasoning
in moral judgment. Cognitive Science, 36(1), 163–177. [Study 1] (Context-based,
unsuccessful, osf.io/ejmyw/).
Random 1: Schaffer, J., & Knobe, J. (2012). Contrastive knowledge surveyed. Noûs,
46(4), 675–708. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/z4e45/).
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Random 2: May, J., & Holton, R. (2012). What in the world is weakness of will?
Philosophical Studies, 157(3), 341–360. [Study 3] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/s37h6/).
*2013
Most cited: Nagel, J., San Juan, V., & Mar, R. A. (2013). Lay denial of knowledge for
justified true beliefs.Cognition, 129(3), 652–661. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/6yfxz/).
Random 1: Beebe, J. R., & Shea, J. (2013). Gettierized Knobe effects. Episteme, 10(3),
219. (Content-based, successful, osf.io/k89fc/).
Random 2: Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2013). The lesson of bypassing. Review of
Philosophy and Psychology, 4(4), 599–619. [Study 1] (Content-based, null effect,
successful, osf.io/ggw7c/).
*2014
Most cited: Murray, D., & Nahmias, E. (2014). Explaining away incompatibilist
intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2), 434–467. [Study 1]
(Content-based, successful, osf.io/rpkjk/).
Random 1: Grau, C., & Pury, C. L. (2014). Attitudes towards reference and
replaceability. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(2), 155–168. (Demographic
effect, unsuccessful, osf.io/xrhqe/).
Random 2: Liao, S., Strohminger, N., & Sripada, C. S. (2014). Empirically investigat-
ing imaginative resistance. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 54(3), 339–355. [Study 2]
(Content-based, successful, osf.io/7e8hz/).
*2015
Most cited: Buckwalter, W., & Schaffer, J. (2015). Knowledge, stakes, and mistakes.
Noûs, 49(2), 201–234. [Study 1] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/2ukpq/).
Random 1: Björnsson, G., Eriksson, J., Strandberg, C., Olinder, R. F., & Björklund, F.
(2015). Motivational internalism and folk intuitions. Philosophical Psychology, 28(5),
715–734. [Study 2] (Content-based, successful, osf.io/d8uvg/).
Random 2: Kominsky, J. F., Phillips, J., Gerstenberg, T., Lagnado, D., & Knobe, J.
(2015). Causal superseding. Cognition, 137, 196–209. [Study 1] (Content-based,
successful, osf.io/f5svw/).
Appendix 2. Pre-replication form
Reference of the paper: ….
Replication team: ….
*Which study in the paper do you replicate? ….
*If it is not the first study, please explain your choice: ….
*In this study, what is the main result you will focus on during replication? Please give
all relevant statistical details present in the paper: ….
*What is the corresponding hypothesis? ….
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*What is the corresponding effect size? ….
*Was the original effect size:
& Explicitly reported in the original paper
& Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information
present in the original paper
& Not inferable from information present in the original paper.
*What is the corresponding confidence interval (if applicable)?
*Was the original confidence interval:
& Explicitly reported in the original paper
& Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information
present in the original paper
& Not inferable from information present in the original paper.
*From which population was the sample used in the original study drawn? (Which
country, language, students/non-students, etc.)
*Was the nature of the original population:
& Explicitly reported in the original paper
& Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information
present in the original paper
& Not inferable from information present in the original paper.
*What was the original sample size (N): ….
*Was the original sample size:
& Explicitly reported in the original paper
& Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information
present in the original paper
& Not inferable from information present in the original paper.
*Does the study involve a selection procedure (e.g. comprehension checks)? (YES/NO).
*If YES, describe it briefly: ….
*Were all the steps of the selection procedure (including, e.g., comprehension checks):
& Explicitly reported in the original paper
& Not explicitly reported in the original paper, but inferable from other information
present in the original paper
& Not inferable from information present in the original paper.
*Overall, would you say that the original paper contained all the information necessary
to properly conduct the replication (YES/NO).
*If NO, explain what information was lacking: ….
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Power analysis and required sample size:
(Please, describe briefly the power analysis you conducted to determine the minimum
required sample size. If the original effect is a null effect, just describe the required
sample size you obtained by doubling the original sample size.)
Projected sample size:
(Please, describe the actual sample size you plan to use in the replication.)
Appendix 3. Post-replication form
Reference of the paper: ….
Replication team: ….
Methods
Power analysis and required sample size:
Please, describe briefly the power analysis you conducted to determine the minimum
required sample size. If the original effect is a null effect, just describe the required
sample size you obtained by doubling the original sample size.)
Actual sample size and population:
(Describe the number of participants you actually recruited, and the nature of the
population they are drawn from. Indicate whether the number of participants you
actually recruited matched the one you planned on the OSF pre-registration. Describe
briefly any difference between the population you drew your sample from and the
population the original study drew its sample from.)
Materials and Procedure:
(Describe the procedure you employed for the replication, like you would in the
Methods section of a paper. At the end, indicate all important differences between
the original study and replication, e.g. language,)
Results
Data analysis - Target effect:
(Focusing on the effect you singled out as the target effect for replication,
describe the results you obtained. Then describe the statistical analyses you
performed, detailing the effect size, the significance of the effect and, when
applicable, the confidence interval.)
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Data analysis - Other effects:
(If the original study included other effects and you performed the corresponding
analyses, please, describe them in this section.)
Data analysis - Exploratory Analysis:
(If you conducted additional analyses that were absent from the original study, feel free
to report them here. Just indicate whether they were planned in the OSF pre-registra-
tion, or exploratory.)
Discussion
Success assessment:
(Did you succeed in replicating the original result? If applicable, does the original team
agree with you?)
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